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Abstract 
 The purpose of this major paper is to examine the potential for the Agreement on Internal 
Trade (“AIT”) to facilitate electricity trade between the provinces of Ontario and Québec. The AIT 
covers a wide range of topics, but its chapter on energy was never completed. The principle 
objective of this paper is to identify current interprovincial trade barriers in the electricity sector 
and determine whether the addition of an energy chapter to the AIT would be a viable method of 
minimizing those barriers. 
 
In recent months, importing electricity from Québec has been increasingly recognized as 
an alternative to building electricity production infrastructure in Ontario. Two recent workshops 
in Toronto and Montréal identified a number of potential benefits that could be achieved through 
greater electricity collaboration between the two provinces. These include technical benefits such 
as greater flexibility and the balancing of intermittent renewable energy resources; economic 
benefits from a price somewhere between what Québec currently receives for its electricity exports 
to the Northeastern United States and the price that Ontario is planning to pay for its nuclear 
refurbishments; and the political opportunity to act cooperatively in demonstrating leadership on 
the issue of climate change. 
 
After briefly going over the potential benefits of interprovincial electricity trade between 
Ontario and Québec, this paper introduces the general concept of internal trade barriers. It then 
gives an overview of the federal and provincial regulators involved in electricity planning in 
Canada, Québec and Ontario, before delving into the technical, political, cultural and regulatory 
barriers present in Canada’s electricity sector. 
 
The paper then gives an introduction to the history, development and structure of the AIT 
before discussing how the AIT energy chapter would relate to recent initiatives to increase Ontario-
Québec electricity cooperation. Finally, it offers suggestions for inclusions that could be made to 
the AIT energy chapter in order to address the internal trade barriers previously identified.  
 
The results of my research indicate that although the AIT could play a meaningful role in 
addressing interprovincial trade barriers in Canada’s electricity sector, it may not be the most 
effective mechanism for specifically facilitating electricity trade between Québec and Ontario. It 
is possible that proceeding bilaterally with agreements such as the Ontario and Québec Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement might be the best way to address the trade barriers between the two 
provinces, given the relative ease through which bilateral agreements have been reached in 
comparison to the difficulties experienced in relation to the AIT negotiations.  
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Foreword 
 This major paper satisfies learning objectives under all four Components of my Area of 
Concentration. My Plan of Study (“POS”) breaks down my Area of Concentration, “Planning for 
Energy Sustainability in Ontario” into the following components: Renewable Energy; Land Use, 
Energy and Resource Planning Law and Policy; Environmental and Energy Law and Policy; and 
Interjurisdictional Trade Law. 
1. Renewable Energy 
In my POS, I express an interest in obtaining a working knowledge of solar power, wind power 
and other renewables. I took courses in the MES year of my program on those topics, and have 
gained practical knowledge of how renewable energy projects are implemented. This major paper 
has allowed me to do in-depth research on a renewable energy source that I had not previously 
looked at – hydro power. 
 Included in my POS is the Learning Objective of becoming familiar with the social, 
technical and political obstacles to the widespread adoption of renewable energy technologies. In 
my major paper, I look at whether the AIT would be a useful tool for addressing current internal 
trade barriers in Canada’s electricity sector in order to facilitate interprovincial electricity trade. 
This has required me to research what technical, regulatory, political and cultural barriers are 
currently driving Ontario’s decision to rely mainly on non-renewable resources as its main source 
of electricity. 
2. Land Use, Energy and Resource Planning Law and Policy 
 My POS sets out the goal of obtaining a working knowledge of the key planning decision-
making and dispute-settlement bodies in Ontario. For my major paper, I have researched the main 
federal electricity sector decision-makers in Canada, and their provincial-level counterparts in 
Ontario and Québec. I have looked at how their histories and involvement in the energy sector has 
affected their specific roles in shaping Canada’s policies around energy planning. 
3. Environmental and Energy Law and Policy 
 Looking at the role of federal and provincial agencies in the energy planning process has 
allowed me to address Learning Objective 3.1 of my POS by familiarizing myself with the roles 
of the provincial and federal governments in the decision-making process. My major paper has 
also required me to become familiar with Canadian internal trade law in the form of the AIT. My 
analysis of the agreement’s utility to promote hydroelectricity imports from Québec to Ontario has 
allowed me to examine ways in which the agreement could help to promote sustainability in 
Canada’s electricity sector.  
4. Interjurisdictional Trade Law 
 My POS sets out the Learning Objective of obtaining a working knowledge of the 
principles informing international trade law. Understanding these principles was important to 
understanding the context in which the AIT was developed in Canada, since many of the same 
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ideas around the benefits of free trade that have shaped international agreements have also 
informed the development of the AIT. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Human-induced climate change is constantly becoming a more urgent issue, and is 
receiving increased attention on the world stage. The importance of addressing global warming is 
especially relevant this year, with the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (“COP21”) 
having been recently held in Paris.1 A new sense of optimism has been built around this 
conference,2 and American President Barack Obama has stated that it could represent a “turning 
point” in global efforts to limit future temperature rises.3 More than 190 Nations took part in the 
negotiations to achieve what 2009 talks in Copenhagen failed to do by establishing a “bigger, 
bolder, wider-ranging and more sophisticated” agreement than the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.4 The 
agreement reached in Paris has been characterized as the first-ever universal, legally binding global 
climate deal.5 With this renewed focus on achieving concrete measures to combat the progression 
of global climate change, Canada has a long way to go to set itself up as a world climate leader. 
An important step for the country will be to work cooperatively to increase the role of renewable 
resources in the Canadian economy. 
 Canada’s environmental policies (or lack thereof) over the past few years, such as its focus 
on fossil fuel extraction and its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol,6 have led to it being 
recognized as one of the worst global actors around the issue of climate change. International 
                                                 
1 For more information on COP21, see: iisd Reporting Services, Event: UNFCC COP 21, online: Climate Change 
Policy & Practice <http://climate-l.iisd.org>. 
2 Jeff Tollefson, “Pledges raise hopes ahead of climate talks” (2015) 527 Nature 418. 
3 “COP21: Paris conference could be climate turning point, says Obama”, BBC News (30 November 2015) online: 
BBC News <http://www.bbc.com>. 
4 David Shukman, “Paris climate summit: Don’t mention Copenhagen”, BBC News (16 September 2015) online: 
BBC News <http://www.bbc.com>; for information on the goals of the Copenhagen conference, see e.g. “Q&A: The 
Copenhagen climate summit”, BBC News (21 December 2009) online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk>;  
5 Highlights of the Paris Agreement can be found at: European Commission, Paris Agreement, online: Climate 
Action <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/>. 
6 “Canada pulls out of Kyoto Protocol”, CBC News (12 December 2011) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>. 
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attention has repeatedly been bestowed upon Canada as a climate “fossil”,7  demonstrating the 
country’s reputation of holding back any serious global progress to slow the warming climate. 
However, recent developments indicate Canada’s potential to become a leader rather than a 
laggard in the fight against climate change. 
In the absence of federal leadership on the issues of energy policy and climate change, 
Canadian provinces have taken it upon themselves to develop their own systems for limiting the 
burning of fossil fuels. Provinces such as Québec, Ontario and British Columbia have proven 
themselves to be leaders in this regard. One by one, Canada’s provincial governments have taken 
measures to limit carbon emissions in order to achieve their own greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
reduction targets.  
Oil-rich Alberta has had a carbon levy in place for the past eight years, and Premier Rachel 
Notley has expressed her intention to double that levy over the next two years.8 British Columbia 
followed suit by bringing in a carbon tax in July 2008.9 Québec implemented a cap-and-trade 
system in January 2013, which it joined to California’s cap-and-trade system under the Western 
Climate Initiative (“WCI”) in January 2014.10  
As of April 2014, the province of Ontario completed the process of phasing out all of its 
coal-fired electricity generation.11 Although originally branded as a measure to protect air quality 
and public health,12 this was also a major step towards reducing the province’s GHG emissions 
                                                 
7 “Canada wins ‘Lifetime Unachievement’ Fossil award at Warsaw climate talks”, Climate Action Network (22 
November 2013) online: Climate Action Network <http://climateactionnetwork.ca>.  
8 Justin Giovanetti, “Alberta to double carbon tax by 2017, strengthen emissions reduction targets”, The Globe and 
Mail (25 June 2015) online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.  
9 “Carbon Tax: Overview of the revenue-neutral carbon tax” online: British Columbia Ministry of Finance 
<http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca>. 
10 “The Carbon Market” online: Government of Québec <http://mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca>. 
11 Ministry of Energy, News Release, “Creating Cleaner Air in Ontario: Province Has Eliminated Coal-Fired 
Generation” (15 April 2014) online: Newsroom <http://news.ontario.ca>. 
12 Derek Leahy, “Ontario’s Electricity Is Officially Coal Free”, DesmogCanada (19 April 2014) online: 
DesmogCanada <www.desmog.ca>. 
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and a move to less carbon-intensive energy infrastructure as part of the province’s 2013 Long 
Term Energy Plan.13 Ontario has indicated its intention to become an active member of the WCI 
along with Québec and California by implementing its own cap-and-trade system.14  Active 
participation in the WCI would bring Ontario closer to achieving its GHG emission reduction goals 
of 15 per cent below 1990 levels by the year 2020, and 80 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050.15  
Although Ontario and Quebec’s participation in the WCI demonstrates movement towards 
greater interprovincial cooperation on the issue of climate change, initiatives undertaken in Canada 
to date have remained at the sub-national level. With each individual Canadian province pursuing 
its own carbon reduction strategies, no concerted efforts have been made towards curbing carbon 
emissions in Canada as a whole. A much higher degree of federal leadership would be required to 
develop any semblance of a national climate change strategy, but federal regulators could have an 
important role to play in coordinating interprovincial initiatives in order to reduce Canada’s overall 
carbon emissions.  
Reducing emissions from the energy sector is an important starting point for Canada’s 
response to climate change. There is a growing recognition that “[e]nergy strategy and climate 
strategy are one and the same thing, not separate policy domains as they are so frequently 
understood to be”.16 In July 2015, premiers of the various Canadian provinces and territories met 
in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, to discuss a national energy strategy.17 Although oil-
                                                 
13 Ontario Ministry of Energy, Achieving Balance: Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan (Toronto: Ministry of Energy, 
2013) [Ontario’s 2013 LTEP]. 
14 Office of the Premier, News Release, “Cap and Trade System to Limit Greenhouse Gas Pollution in Ontario” (13 
April 2015) online: Newsroom <http://news.ontario.ca> [Cap and Trade System News Release]. 
15 Robert Benzie, “Ontario outlines options for cap-and-trade scheme to reduce emissions” (13 November 2015) 
online: The Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com>. 
16 Simon Dalby, “Is Canada’s economic future free of fossil fuels?” (13 January 2016), online: OpenCanada.org 
<http://www.opencanada.org>. 
17 Jane Taber & Adrian Morrow, “Premiers agree on energy strategy with weakened climate change pledges” The 
Globe and Mail (17 July 2015) online: The Globe and Mail <http://theglobeandmail.com>; a statement by the 
Premiers from that meeting is available at Heather Maclean, “Premiers support joint action on climate change” 
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rich provinces such as Alberta and Saskatchewan took this meeting as an opportunity to ensure 
that their resources can get to market, 18 there has been some movement by the governments of 
Québec and Ontario to use a national energy strategy as a means for making sure that all Canadian 
provinces are committed to cutting carbon emissions in the energy sector.19 Experts have suggested 
that getting all provinces on the same page and adopting a multi-faceted approach to addressing 
climate change is the best strategy for moving towards a low-carbon future. In an interview with 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s radio show The Current in November 2015, Professor 
Mark Jaccard of Simon Fraser University suggested that a mix of the strategies already 
implemented by each individual province is the most worthwhile approach, but that there is a 
serious need for the federal government to become involved in order to coordinate among the 
various provinces.20  
With a new federal government having taken power in Canada in fall 2015, recent 
developments indicate that Professor Jaccard’s suggestion could become a reality. Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau has made his intention clear to cooperate with provincial and territorial 
governments by inviting Canada’s premiers to accompany him as part of Canada’s delegation at 
the COP21 meeting in Paris,21 stating that “[t]o fight climate change, we’re all in this together”.22  
Although national cooperation to reduce GHG emissions from Canada’s energy sector has 
not yet materialized, steps have been taken to facilitate interprovincial cooperation in a variety of 
                                                 
Office of the Premier, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, online: Canada’s Premiers 
<http://canadaspremiers.ca>. 
18 Adrian Morrow, “What you need to know about the Canadian Energy Strategy”, The Globe and Mail (15 July 
2015) online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
19Ibid. 
20 Radio panel of Mark Jaccard and Gordon McBean (30 November 2015) on The Current Special Edition: Two 
Degrees, CBC Radio, Toronto. 
21 “‘Canada is back,’ Trudeau tells delegates at COP21 in Paris” (30 November 2015) online: 
<http://www.ctvnews.ca>. 
22 Ryan Maloney, “Trudeau Tweets COP21 Photo With Leaders, Says ‘We’re All In This Together’”, The 
Huffington Post Canada (30 November 2015) online: The Huffington Post Canada <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca>.  
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areas. One such initiative has focused on removing barriers to interprovincial trade. The 
Agreement on Internal Trade (“AIT”)23 was signed on July 18 1994 and came into force in 199524 
as a means of reducing interprovincial trade barriers and increasing the beneficial impacts of trade 
between the Canadian provinces and territories. It contains chapters focusing on a number of 
subject-areas, including such topics as Investment, Labour Mobility and Natural Resources 
Processing. Chapter Twelve of the AIT was meant to focus on Energy, but remains as-of-yet 
unfinished. Although the AIT was designed with a traditional neo-liberal concept of free-trade in 
mind, the agreement may have the potential to render Canada’s energy sector more sustainable.  
Increased electricity trade between the provinces of Ontario and Québec has been 
suggested in recent months as a potential strategy for increasing interprovincial cooperation on the 
issue of climate change, developing a more sustainable electricity sector in Canada, and helping 
the two provinces to make strides both economically and environmentally. Two workshops were 
held in January and April 2015 in Toronto and Montréal respectively, in order to explore the 
potential for increased energy trade between the two provinces. A summary report titled Ontario, 
Québec, Electricity and Climate Change: Advancing the Dialogue25 (“Advancing the Dialogue”) 
was subsequently published, outlining the findings of these two workshops.  
In this paper, I will examine whether the time is right for an energy chapter to be finalized 
and added to the AIT, and what that energy chapter should contain. Specifically, I will focus on 
the potential AIT chapter’s ability to facilitate internal trade between Canadian provinces and 
whether drafting an AIT energy chapter could be a useful step in moving forward with greater 
                                                 
23 Agreement on Internal Trade: Consolidated Version (Winnipeg: Internal Trade Secretariat, 2015) [AIT]. 
24 “Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT)” (20 September 2005) online: Library of Parliament 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca>. 
25 James Gaede, Ontario, Québec, Electricity and Climate Change: Advancing the Dialogue, Studies in Ontario 
Electricity Policy Series Paper No 6, translated by Pascale Giroux-Denis (9 July 2015) [Advancing the Dialogue]. 
11 
 
electricity collaboration between Québec and Ontario. Although the chapter would apply to 
Canada’s energy sector as a whole, including areas such as the fossil fuel industry, I will focus 
specifically on the AIT’s effects on electricity trade and its potential to aid in achieving the benefits 
outlined in Advancing the Dialogue. 
After briefly going over the key benefits that electricity collaboration between Ontario and 
Québec could bring to the two provinces, I will describe the nature of trade barriers generally, and 
the existing literature on internal trade barriers in Canada. That section will highlight the ways in 
which the Canadian federal system can create internal trade barriers. That will be followed by an 
overview of the current regulatory regime in Canada’s electricity sector outlining the key agencies 
involved in the development and implementation of energy policies at the federal level, and 
provincially in Québec and Ontario.  I will then give an overview of the potential technical and 
regulatory barriers to interprovincial electricity trade between Ontario and Québec, coming to the 
conclusion that they could be overcome with sufficient political will. The disjointed nature of the 
Canadian regulatory regime seems to largely be the result of political and cultural barriers, which 
will also be discussed. I will then turn my attention to tracing the history and key principles of the 
AIT. I will examine the reasons for which it was originally drafted, what it seeks to accomplish, 
and how successful it has been at achieving its goals. Finally, I will point out ways in which an 
AIT energy chapter could help to facilitate electricity trade between Ontario and Québec, using 
other agreements and the already-drafted AIT chapters as examples of the form that a potential 
energy chapter could take. I will discuss how drafting an AIT energy chapter could advance the 
developing partnership between Ontario and Québec along with recently signed memoranda of 
understanding (“MOUs”) and the Advancing the Dialogue report, by cementing the political will 
that has been demonstrated lately in relation to this issue.  
12 
 
In order to accomplish the goals set out above, I will need to establish a framework through 
which to address the issues I have described. Although hydroelectricity is often considered to be 
environmentally benign, it has come under scrutiny in the past for the potential impacts that large 
hydroelectric projects can have on the local environment as well as the traditional territories of 
First Nations.26  The pros and cons of hydro power are beyond the scope of this paper. Under 
Ontario’s most recent Long Term Energy Plan it is considered a renewable energy resource, 27  and 
I will be considering it as such for the purposes of my own research.  
The benefits of obtaining increased hydro power from Québec are outlined in the 
Advancing the Dialogue report, and I will not be addressing them here in great detail. Based on 
that report and Ontario’s current energy strategy to increase the province’s reliance on renewable 
energy, I will be considering greater access to hydroelectricity from Québec as a positive outcome. 
For this reason, any headway that can be made in eliminating internal barriers to the trade of 
electricity between the two provinces will also be assessed favorably. Therefore, my goal is to 
examine ways in which a new AIT energy chapter could eliminate any such barriers in order to 
facilitate internal electricity trade, especially if those strategies can help to ensure a reliable source 
of clean electricity from Québec.  
I must also acknowledge that increasing the portion of electricity that Ontario imports from 
Québec, even if it is from renewable sources, will not necessarily reduce overall greenhouse gas 
emissions when calculated on a regional scale. It is possible that an increase in hydroelectricity 
from Québec onto the Ontario grid will mean a reduction of clean energy going to the Northeastern 
                                                 
26 See for example Graham Lane, Dam-Nation: Rolling the Dice on Manitoba’s Future (Frontier Centre for Public 
Policy, 2013); Markus Schorbus & Dave Rodenhuis, Assessing Hydrologic Impacts on Water Resources in BC: 
Summary Report: Joint Workshop, BC Hydro, 20 April 2010, (Pacific Climate Impacts Consortium, University of 
Victoria, 2010); and Philip M Fearnside, “Environmental and Social Impacts of Hydroelectric Dams in Brazilian 
Amazonia: Implications for the Aluminum Industry” (2016) 77 World Development 48. 
27 Ontario’s 2013 LTEP, supra note 13 at 6.  
13 
 
United States, which is currently the greatest importer of Québec’s electricity.28 This may result 
in the net amount of greenhouse gas emissions in the region remaining constant, or even going up, 
if such a reduction in clean hydropower to the United States is replaced by other, dirtier sources 
of electricity. However, that is also beyond the scope of the current paper. I am approaching this 
issue from a Canadian standpoint, and one specifically focusing on energy planning in the province 
of Ontario. Although the discussion will also touch on electricity policy and infrastructure in 
Québec, and will tie into the broader debate around a national energy strategy in Canada, my main 
focus remains on the province of Ontario and working towards its GHG reduction targets. As such, 
any reduction in Ontario’s reliance on non-renewable resources will be considered a positive 
outcome, without going into speculation on whether it could result in increased emissions from 
areas outside of the province’s jurisdiction.  
With the above considerations in mind, I hope that the following analysis will be useful in 
imagining what contributions a new AIT energy chapter could make towards developing a more 
sustainable electricity grid in Ontario. 
2. The potential benefits of interprovincial electricity trade 
An increase in electricity trade between Québec and Ontario could benefit the two 
provinces in a number of ways, as outlined in Advancing the Dialogue. It could allow for less 
infrastructure to be built to accommodate the provinces’ peak demands. This would be in the form 
of a capacity-swap agreement that would allow each province to import electricity from the other 
when its own demand is highest. This arrangement is a good fit for the situation of Québec and 
                                                 
28 See Mourad Ben Amor et al, “Electricity trade and GHG emissions: Assessment of Quebec’s hydropower in the 
Northeastern American market (2006-2008)” (2011) 39 Energy Policy 1711 [Ben Amor, “Quebec Electricity 
Trade”]. 
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Ontario since the former is a winter-peaking jurisdiction while the latter’s highest demand occurs 
in the summer.29 
Ontario’s most recent Long-Term Energy Plan recognizes that an import arrangement with 
a neighboring jurisdiction could offer a “cost-effective alternative to building domestic supply”.30 
Notably, it could help Ontario to increase the amount of electricity that it receives from renewable 
sources, thereby reducing the province’s reliance on more carbon-intensive technologies such as 
natural gas. This could prove to be especially important while the province goes through with 
nuclear refurbishments and requires a temporary source of electricity to fill the void left by the 
offline nuclear plants. Hydro power from Québec also has the potential to eliminate the necessity 
for nuclear refurbishments at all, and it could reduce the need for natural gas and other carbon-
emitting energy sources in the long term. Its ability to store excess energy and respond in real-time 
to the fluctuating needs of the electricity grid also mean that it could provide increased flexibility. 
This makes it especially compatible with intermittent renewable sources like wind and solar, 31 on 
which the province of Ontario is also aiming to increase its reliance.32  
Québec is the largest producer of electricity in Canada, with almost all of its electricity 
production coming from low-carbon hydro power.33 Hydroelectricity makes up 91 per cent of 
Québec’s installed capacity34 and more than 99 per cent of the province’s actual electricity 
generation.35 Québec has a total installed generation capacity of 41,018 megawatts and the ability 
                                                 
29 Advancing the Dialogue, supra note 25 at 31. 
30 Ontario’s 2013 LTEP, supra note 13 at 45. 
31 Stéphane Bordeleau, “Where Canada’s surplus energy goes”, CBC News (30 March 2011) online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca>. 
32 Ontario’s 2013 LTEP, supra note 13 at 24. 
33 Canada, National Energy Board, Canadian Electricity: Trends and Issues (Calgary: National Energy Board, 2001) 
at 41 [NEB, Trends and Issues]. 
34 Ben Amor, “Quebec Electricity Trade”, supra note 28 at 1711. 
35 Hydro-Québec, Our Energy, online: Hydro-Québec <http://www.hydroquebec.com>; Roger Lanoue & Normand 
Mousseau, Maîtriser notre avenir énergétique : Pour le bénéfice économique, environnemental et social de tous 
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to export 8380 megawatts, approximately 20 per cent of its total.36 It tends to produce large 
excesses of electricity,37 and currently sells much of this surplus to consumers in the Northeastern 
United States.38  
With recent developments in the natural gas market resulting in depressed electricity prices 
in the Northeastern US, Québec has seen the value of its electricity exports stagnate at around three 
to four cents per kilowatt hour, even as the quantity has increased.39 According to a report by 
Équiterre and the Ontario Clean Air Alliance, the price that Québec receives for its exported 
electricity fell by 50 per cent between 2008 and 2012.40 Given the lower revenue generated by its 
electricity exports in recent years, Québec could feel potential financial benefits from increased 
energy trade with Ontario, where the cost to refurbish the Darlington nuclear plant alone is 
expected to be around 8.7 cents per kilowatt hour. The Advancing the Dialogue report suggests 
that if Québec and Ontario were to meet in the middle by negotiating a trade agreement to import 
electricity from the former into the latter at a price of approximately six cents per kilowatt hour, 
both provinces could benefit by approximately 14 billion dollars over the course of 20 years.41 
This type of cooperation is also a step in the right direction towards a national energy strategy in 
Canada, and could help to keep electricity prices in Ontario low once the province becomes an 
active partner in the WCI by reducing the need for natural gas-fired electricity generation.42 
                                                 
(Montréal : Commission sur les enjeux énergétiques du Québec, 2014) at 67 [Lanoue & Mousseau, Maîtriser notre 
avenir énergétique].  
36 Ben Amor, “Quebec Electricity Trade”, supra note 28 at 1711. 
37 Lanoue & Mousseau, Maîtriser notre avenir énergétique, supra note 35 at 105. 
38 For a breakdown of Québec’s electricity exports to neighbouring jurisdictions, see Ben Amor, “Quebec Electricity 
Trade”, supra note 28. 
39 Advancing the Dialogue, supra note 25 at i. 
40 Équiterre & Ontario Clean Air Alliance Research, Exporting Electricity: To Promote Greater Collaboration 
Between Québec and Ontario (June 2014). 
41 Advancing the Dialogue, supra note 25 at 29. 
42 Ibid at 27. 
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Given the potential benefits from interprovincial electricity trade discussed at the 
conferences in Toronto and Montréal, the Advancing the Dialogue report identifies three potential 
routes for collaboration that could be taken by Québec and Ontario. The first involves a small-
scale agreement to swap capacity in the summer and winter according to each province’s peak 
demand. The second option would see the two provinces enter into a longer-term, larger-scale 
agreement to either replace the need for natural gas-fired generation during Ontario’s nuclear 
refurbishments or to eliminate the need for nuclear refurbishments altogether, allowing Ontario’s 
nuclear plants to be decommissioned once they reach the end of their life-cycles. The third option 
would see Québec and Ontario enter into a “grand bargain” by building on the second option. It 
would incorporate the two provinces’ involvement in the WCI and use Québec’s hydro capacity 
to store excess energy generated by Ontario’s growing intermittent renewable energy sector.43 
Each of these options could benefit from a reduction of Canada’s internal trade barriers in order to 
facilitate the process of designing the necessary trade agreements. 
3. Internal trade barriers  
 Answering the question of whether an AIT energy chapter would be useful for facilitating 
increased electricity trade between the provinces of Ontario and Québec requires us to consider 
what barriers currently exist to interprovincial electricity trade in Canada.   
The concept of free trade 
As an economic concept, free trade is centered on the theory of comparative advantage. 
This theory is based on the idea that some trading partners tend to have relative advantages over 
others in producing certain types of products and services, and that everyone would be better off 
                                                 
43 Advancing the Dialogue, supra note 25 at ii. 
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if each trading partner specialized in the production in which they have an advantage.44 The move 
towards freer trade began in the wake of the high-tariff protectionism of the 1930s,45 and free trade 
as an operating concept became more widespread after the Second World War, with efforts to 
liberalize international trade through successive rounds of negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).46 Global international trade initiatives have resulted 
in a number of subsequent free trade agreements.47 Trade barriers are not, however, only an 
international phenomenon, and studies have shown that international trade has increased 
drastically over recent decades while interprovincial exports within Canada have gone steadily 
down,48 indicating that interprovincial trade barriers are present within Canada’s domestic 
economy. In fact, former federal Industry Minister James Moore has acknowledged that trade deals 
with the United States and Europe have meant that trade is easier internationally between Canada 
and foreign markets than it is domestically between Canadian provinces.49 
Trade barriers within Canada 
There are indications that internal trade barriers do have an impact on the Canadian 
economy. Although studies to quantify intra-provincial and inter-provincial trade costs in Canada 
at the sectoral level are relatively new,50 authors such as Agnosteva et al have shown that trade 
barriers do exist between Canadian provinces to varying degrees in multiple different industries. 
                                                 
44 For a discussion on the principles underlying international free trade, including comparative advantage, see for 
example Michael J Trebilcock & Robert W Howse, The regulation of international trade, 3d ed (London: 
Routledge, 2005). 
45 Michael Hart, “The end of trade policy?” in Canada among nations: 1993-94 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
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46 G Bruce Doern & Mark MacDonald, Free-Trade Federalism: Negotiating the Canadian Agreement on Internal 
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Canadian Business Economics 26 at 26. 
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In their study comparing what Canadian provinces consume from their own production versus 
what they receive through trade with each other, Tombe and Winter found the overall trade cost 
between Ontario and Québec to be approximately 40 per cent.51 Many authors have argued that 
this prevalence of trade barriers between Canadian provinces can be largely traced back to the fact 
that Canada operates under of a federalist system, with a constitutional division of powers between 
the federal and provincial governments.52   
Doern and MacDonald assert that the details of federal systems of governance play a large 
role in how internal trade issues are approached within countries, stating that the “division of 
powers between levels of government will […] have some effect on what kind of internal common 
market is intended to exist in a federation”.53 In early federations such as Canada, internal trade 
was generally addressed in the assignment of power over interprovincial trade and commerce to 
the federal government.54 The Canadian federal government enjoys this power, and has 
constitutional jurisdiction over interprovincial trade pursuant to its ability to regulate trade and 
commerce under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.55  This does not however mean that 
potential trade barriers between provinces within a federation are all addressed through the division 
of powers, or that this was the case in Canada. Indeed, Canada’s federal system of government has 
been identified as the root of the country’s interprovincial barriers to trade.56 
                                                 
51 Trevor Tombe & Jennifer Winter, “Internal Trade and Aggregate Productivity: Evidence from Canada” (2013) 
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Section 121 of the Constitution Act, 186757 addresses the issue of interprovincial trade by 
stating that “[a]ll articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the Provinces 
shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces.” It has however 
been pointed out that Section 121 does not address non-tariff internal trade barriers, capital, 
services or labour, “each of which has been the focal point of many interprovincial trade flow 
restrictions”.58  
Internal trade barriers can take a number of shapes, but are often in the form of differences 
between provincial regulatory schemes. As an example, a 2013 article in Maclean’s magazine 
highlighted the situation of restaurant-owner and gourmet food packager Jennifer Warren-Part 
from Gatineau Hills, Québec. 59 As quoted in the article, Warren-Part cites the governments of 
Ontario and Québec’s reluctance to recognize each other’s food-safety laws as a barrier preventing 
the Québec restaurant-owner from selling some of her produce on the other side of the provincial 
border. The article points out that the provinces aren’t obliged to accept each other’s standards, 
and that even though big food companies can get federal licenses to ship in bulk across provincial 
boundaries, those federal regulations are not amenable to small artisanal producers. The article 
gives a few other examples of sectors in which interprovincial trade barriers are apparent, including 
the wine and gasoline industries. 
Although the examples of trade barriers discussed in the Maclean’s article are not specific 
to interprovincial electricity trade, they speak to the type of barriers that are not readily apparent 
and yet which can have severe impacts on free trade between provinces. It is clear that 
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Canada 1997) at p 36 [Clendenning & Clendenning, International Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanisms]. 
59 John Geddes & Nick Taylor-Vaisey, “Home is where the trade barriers are”, Maclean’s (29 October 2013) online: 
Macleans.ca <http://www.macleans.ca>. 
20 
 
interprovincial trade barriers exist and that they can limit the free flow of goods and services 
between Canadian jurisdictions. It was in fact a recognition that the Canadian internal market had 
too many barriers (often in the shape of excessively interventionist provincial government policies) 
that precipitated the creation of the AIT.60 At the time of the AIT’s creation, comparisons were 
drawn between Canada and the United States, and even Canada and Europe, suggesting that those 
other jurisdictions enjoyed “a more open and fulsome economic union”.61 With specific regards to 
the United States, the American political system was not only seen as endorsing capitalism, free 
markets, and limited government, but also of pursuing more vigilant policies regarding the defense 
of interstate commerce and competition.62 In Canada, perhaps because of the country’s federalist 
structure, it has been recognized that the restrictions experienced on the flow of goods and services 
are the result of a lack of coordination between different levels of government in developing 
regulations and regulatory measures, resulting in unnecessary duplication and compliance costs.63  
4. The electricity sector regulatory regime 
 The disjointed nature of Canada’s electricity sector regulatory regime is one of the greatest 
barriers that the AIT energy chapter would have to address. The number of agencies involved in 
electricity planning in Canada make achieving a coordinated vision a complicated process. Lack 
of synergy among different regulators is a potential barrier to interprovincial electricity trade, but 
could be addressed through greater coordination. The following section highlights some of the key 
actors in the Canadian, Québec and Ontario electricity sectors. 
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The National Energy Board 
 The National Energy Board (“NEB”) is Canada’s main federal energy regulator. Doern and 
Gattinger describe a broad evolution of the NEB’s role in Canada’s energy sector over three main 
periods since 1947, roughly corresponding to different levels of reliance on markets versus state 
intervention as an influence over the nature and pace of energy and resource development.64 The 
reasons behind the NEB’s establishment in 1959, besides the regulation of west-east pipelines, 
were largely focused on advising the federal government on broad energy matters and regulating 
the export of oil, gas and electricity.65 From the outset, the NEB’s primary function was to be a 
sectoral planner, using its powers to regulate interprovincial pipelines and exports of oil, natural 
gas and electricity, in order to ensure that Canada could meet its long-term needs.66 Within just a 
few years of its creation, the NEB had cemented its role as the primary policy adviser to the federal 
government on energy issues.67 Within a decade, however, the NEB was displaced as a key policy 
advisor based largely on a growing concern that it was too close to industry and that the 
government in Ottawa was too dependent on its information.68 This led to the NEB’s replacement 
as primary policy advisor by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, and the assumption 
of some of the NEB’s regulatory functions by the government and other agencies.69 In the 1980s, 
the NEB was completely displaced from its role as regulatory agency and policy adviser with the 
announcement of a National Energy Program (“NEP”) in Canada. However, when the Mulroney 
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Conservative government took power in 1984 it subsequently dismantled the NEP, allowing the 
NEB to re-establish itself as part of the Canadian regulatory regime.70 
 Today, the NEB is described by Doern and Gattinger as “an independent federal regulatory 
tribunal which reports to Parliament through the minister of natural resources”.71 The board 
consists of no more than nine members, appointed to hold office in good behavior for a period of 
seven years.72 According to the National Energy Board Act (“NEB Act”), the NEB functions as a 
court of record and has the authority to determine any matter where it appears that someone has 
violated the NEB Act or any regulation, certificate, license or permit made by the board.73 The 
NEB’s responsibilities include the regulation of interprovincial pipelines and powerlines, the 
import and export of energy as well as undertaking energy studies and providing advice to the 
Minister of Natural Resources and to Parliament upon request.74  
The NEB’s mandate focuses mainly on the oil and gas industry, concentrating on both 
interprovincial and international pipelines. It does not regulate interprovincial electricity trade.75 
Even so, there is room for the NEB to become involved in an advisory/coordination role. It already 
enforces measures to promote interprovincial trade, such as a Fair Market Access (“FMA”) 
provision under section 119.06 (2)(c) of the NEB Act. This section requires that applicants for 
electricity export permits inform those interested in buying electricity in Canada of the quantities 
and classes of services available for sale, and that the applicants give the opportunity within a 
reasonable time for the electricity to be purchased for consumption in Canada on terms as favorable 
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as those specified in the application.76 The NEB has shied away from stating outright that this 
section actually ensures a “right of first refusal”, pointing out that the FMA provision “does not 
oblige an applicant to carry out any specific procedure such as allowing interception of its proposed 
exports”. Rather, it describes the essential elements of the FMA provision as “the existence of an 
equal opportunity” and “an onus on both parties to negotiate in good faith”.77 Even with east-west 
electricity trade in Canada falling under the jurisdictions of provincial regulators rather than the 
NEB itself,78 the federal agency does have the potential to help facilitate coordination among those 
provincial regulators through sectoral planning in order to encourage interprovincial cooperation.  
Provincial regulators 
Québec 
 The province of Québec is the largest electricity market in Canada, and is especially rich 
in hydroelectric resources.79 Until the 1940s, Québec’s electricity was provided by a number of 
small, privately-owned enterprises. This ended when, concerned over high electricity rates in 
comparison with those in the province of Ontario, the provincial government formed the crown 
corporation Hydro-Québec in 1944.80 Although rural electricity provision was at first left in the 
hands of the Rural Electrification Agency, Québec’s electricity system was made almost entirely 
public in 1963.81 Hydro-Québec’s mandate was to use the province of Québec’s hydroelectric 
resources to generate electricity and ensure that all Québec residents had access to energy at 
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uniform rates, which were to be set no higher than to cover the corporation’s investments and 
operational costs. 82 To this day the Québec market is almost entirely supplied by Hydro-Québec.83  
 As part of a new energy policy adopted by the government of Québec in the mid-1990s, 
the Régie de l’énergie (“Régie”) was created in 1997 as an independent, quasi-judicial economic 
regulatory agency. The Régie is now responsible for regulating major energy markets in the 
province.84 The Act Respecting the Régie de l’énergie85 established the mandate of the Régie with 
regards to the electricity sector in order to: 
 regulate monopoly activities related to the supply of electric power; 
 ensure that market activities are to the benefit of consumers;  
 encourage healthy competition among businesses; 
 set the rates and service conditions for Hydro-Québec; 
 set rates for electricity transmission; and 
 approve contracts for the purchase, trade and export of electricity86 
Ontario 
The publicly owned crown corporation Ontario Hydro was the major player in Ontario’s 
energy sector for most of the twentieth century, and functioned as both the main generator and 
transmitter of power. 87 However, the main electricity regulator in Ontario today is the Ontario 
Energy Board (“OEB”). The OEB was created in 1960 with the limited mandate of setting rates 
for the sale, distribution and storage of natural gas.88 Although the role of the OEB has evolved 
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over the past half-century, Doern and Gattinger suggest that the OEB experienced much more 
uneven change over recent decades than did the NEB.89 In the 1990s, Ontario’s provincial 
government undertook drastic restructuring of the electricity sector including regulatory reforms 
to breakup Ontario Hydro, creating a wholesale electricity market and giving the OEB 
responsibility for regulating part of the electricity sector.90 This resulted in the OEB becoming a 
regulatory agency with an expanded role in electricity as well as gas regulation, and a larger 
regulatory system now consisting of players such as the Ontario Cabinet, the Independent Market 
Operator (“IMO”), the federal Competition Bureau and the Ontario Hydro successor companies 
such as Hydro One.91 The OEB is now an expanded, quasi-judicial tribunal for which the Minister 
of Energy has legislative responsibility.92 Besides regulating all market participants in both the 
natural gas and electricity industries, it provides advice on energy matters referred to it by the 
Ministers of Science and of Natural Resources.93 
In 2005, the IMO became the Independent Electricity System Operator (“IESO”) through 
the introduction of Bill 100.94 While oversight responsibility was assigned to the OEB, the IESO’s 
mandate includes: balancing the province’s supply and demand for electricity in real-time; 
planning for the province’s medium- and long-term energy needs, as well as securing clean energy 
sources to meet those needs; overseeing the province’s electricity wholesale market; and fostering 
the development of a culture of electricity conservation in Ontario.95 Through its mandate to 
regulate investments in the expansion of the transmission grid, the OEB and IESO are to work 
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together to ensure that adequate transmission capacity is developed in order to maintain reliability 
and to promote the growth of competition.96 
In 2009, the IESO undertook its own report looking at the feasibility of greater cooperation 
in the electricity sector between Ontario and neighboring provinces and states, 97 at the request of 
the Minister of Energy. The report’s focus was on the technical capabilities of Ontario’s electrical 
interties with other jurisdictions, as well as possible infrastructure investments, commercial 
arrangements and market factors, in order to determine the practical feasibility of greater 
interprovincial energy system integration.98 It specifically examined potential movement towards 
increased cooperation with Québec. Although it found that new infrastructure would have to be 
developed depending on the extent of a possible agreement,99 the report concluded that the Ontario 
Power Authority (“OPA”) and IESO should work together with Hydro-Québec “to explore 
opportunities for clean imports when such imports would have system benefits and are cost 
effective for Ontario ratepayers”.100 It also concluded that “the OPA should continue to evaluate 
and regularly update the Minster of Energy on the specific parameters for clean-energy import 
arrangements that would best meet Ontario’s needs and circumstances”.101 
5. Trade barriers in the electricity sector 
 Internal trade barriers are present throughout the Canadian economy, and the electricity 
sector is no exception. For evidence of these trade barriers, one need simply look at the amount of 
electricity exported southward towards the United States in comparison to the electricity currently 
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being traded between Canadian provinces. A 2010 report by the C.D. Howe Institute came to the 
conclusion that in 2008, Canada’s total electricity exports to the United States were worth 3.8 
billion dollars, while domestic interprovincial trade equaled just half a billion dollars.102 Figure 1 
illustrates the north-south orientation of Canada’s electricity transmission infrastructure. 
Figure 1 – Major North American Electricity Transmission Lines 
 
Source: Jan Carr, Power Sharing: Developing Inter-Provincial Electricity Trade, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 
(July 2010) at 2. 
 
The placement of major North American electricity transmission lines demonstrates not 
just the different interconnectedness of Canada’s electricity sector in comparison to that of the US 
– it also shows that Canadian provinces are currently equipped to export more electricity to 
American customers than to each other. In order to determine whether the AIT energy chapter 
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could help to alter this trend, I will be examining the technical, regulatory and political/cultural 
barriers that have shaped the current state of Canada’s electricity transmission infrastructure. 
Technical barriers 
 Ontario has the infrastructure capacity to import electricity from neighboring jurisdictions 
in the form of 26 interties with two provinces and three states.103 Ontario already imports a limited 
amount of electricity from Québec, so the only remaining technical question is whether existing 
infrastructure is robust enough to import sufficient amounts of electricity or if new investments 
would be necessary. In its 2009 report on the state of Ontario’s electrical interties to other 
jurisdictions, the IESO suggests a number of potential technical options for increasing Ontario’s 
participation in interprovincial electricity trade.104 Although it concludes that infrastructure 
investments would be required depending on the amount of future electricity transmitted between 
Québec and Ontario, the report states that a transmission upgrade in the Ottawa area will already 
be necessary around the year 2020 to meet local reliability needs.105 The report breaks down the 
level of investment that would be needed to allow for various import scenarios. For example, it 
estimates that an investment of 325 million dollars would be required to allow for firm imports up 
to 1,000 megawatts through the Ottawa area, 500 million dollars for imports up to 1,800 
megawatts, and an estimated 1.4 billion dollars for imports up to 3,300 megawatts.106 Although 
these investments are significant, they are still far less than the 12.8 billion dollar refurbishment 
cost of the Darlington nuclear plant,107 which generates 3,512 megawatts of electricity108 – just 
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212 megawatts more than the most expensive import scenario examined by the IESO. It is therefore 
clear that the technical feasibility of the project is not an issue, and expanding Ontario’s electrical 
interties could even be cheaper than refurbishing the province’s nuclear plants.  
With the technical feasibility of increased electricity trade over Ontario’s interties having 
been assessed by the IESO, increased electricity trade between Ontario and Québec is mostly 
dependent on the political will of provincial governments and coordination among provincial and 
federal electricity regulators. When approving the refurbishment of the Darlington Nuclear facility 
in January 2016, Energy Minister Bob Chiarelli stated that the government was choosing to 
proceed with the nuclear refurbishment rather than opting for greater electricity imports from 
Québec because “[l]ong-term, permanent power from Quebec” was “not affordable because the 
infrastructure required makes it absolutely prohibitive to move forward”.109 Given that the 
minister’s comments contradict the findings of the IESO, other reasons must be contributing to the 
government’s reluctance to engage in electricity trade with Québec to a level that could replace 
some of Ontario’s planned nuclear refurbishments. To address this issue, the AIT energy chapter 
would need to focus on tackling the political, cultural and regulatory obstacles currently hampering 
interprovincial electricity trade.  
Political and cultural barriers 
In order to address the apparent reluctance of the Ontario Government to commit to 
electricity imports from Québec, we must first understand the factors that have given rise to this 
barrier to interprovincial trade. The existing literature on this subject seems to indicate that the 
factors currently fragmenting Canada’s electricity sector are mostly political and cultural in nature.  
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The idea of large-scale interprovincial electricity trade is not new, with David Cass-Beggs 
having suggested in 1960 that Ontario use all of its available hydro-generating capacity along with 
some electricity from coal-fired plants, and import surplus electricity from Québec, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba.110 However, the historic independence of the provinces from one 
another, their wish to be self-reliant, and previously unsuccessful electricity transmission 
partnerships seem to have prevented this type of integration from occurring, leading instead to the 
current state of disjointedness.  
Pineau suggests that the historically provincial nature of Canada’s electricity system has 
meant that many consumers see their local utilities as part of their culture and identity.111 This can 
likely be traced all the way back to the provincial autonomy protected under Canada’s federalist 
constitution, and has led to a resentment of “out-of-province interference” in the electricity sector 
and the belief that electricity should be consumed locally.112 Canada’s provincialist legacy of 
retaining complete provincial control over the electricity system in order to address only domestic 
interests has been recognized as a barrier to trade.113  
In a recent interview on TVO’s The Agenda,114 Jack Gibbons of the Ontario Clean Air 
Alliance expressed his support for Ontario importing hydroelectricity from Québec and articulated 
reasons which may explain the provinces’ current reluctance to engage in greater electricity trade. 
Citing a desire to be self-reliant on electricity, Gibbons used the term “electricity separatism” to 
describe the current mindset pervading Ontario’s electricity sector. He traced this attitude back to 
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the early 20th century, when Ontario still had large amounts of untapped hydro-electric resources. 
Karl Froschauer of Simon Fraser University has also suggested that a desire to develop untapped 
hydro-electric resources contributed to Canada’s provincially-focused electricity sector, since 
provinces sought to “expand the generation of hydro-electricity in order to advance provincial 
industrial development and to profit from exports to the US”.115 According to Gibbons, this 
sentiment continued into the 1950s when nuclear power came into widespread use. The belief that 
the new technology would be “too cheap to meter” perpetuated the idea that Ontario should remain 
self-reliant on electricity. These ideas, according to Gibbons, have persisted “beyond their time 
period”.116 The Agenda host Steve Paikin asked Mr. Gibbons whether the concerns over being 
electricity self-reliant are not warranted, given that some commentators equate electricity security 
to “almost a national security issue”.117 In response, Gibbons pointed out that many resources upon 
which Ontario relies are imported from other jurisdictions, including nearly all of Ontario’s natural 
gas, which comes predominantly from Alberta and Pennsylvania.118 
Another potential disadvantage of importing hydroelectricity from Québec which was 
brought up in the interview involves the jobs that would be lost by shutting down generating plants 
in Ontario in favour of electricity imports. The issue of job creation was cited by the Ontario 
Government in a recent news release in which it committed to moving forward with nuclear 
refurbishments. Specifically, it stated that the Darlington nuclear refurbishment would contribute 
15 billion dollars to Ontario’s gross domestic product throughout the life of the project and create 
up to 11,800 jobs annually.119 Gibbons, however, contends that Ontario’s nuclear reactors should 
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be decommissioned when reach the end of their lives and replaced with hydroelectric imports. This 
suggestion is based on the estimate that, considering the high price of nuclear refurbishments, 
Ontario could save 600 million dollars annually by implementing this strategy.120 As previously 
described in this paper in reference to technical barriers, the IESO’s report on Ontario’s electrical 
interties confirms that investing in transmission infrastructure could result in lower costs than 
proceeding with nuclear refurbishments. In response to the question of job loss, Gibbons points 
out that the money saved by importing electricity rather than refurbishing Ontario’s nuclear plants 
could be used for infrastructure and other investments.121 Ontario could potentially make up for 
the jobs that would be lost through shutting down power plants by investing in other areas of the 
economy. 
The “electricity separatism” described by Mr. Gibbons on The Agenda may also be the 
result of previous negative experiences with interprovincial electricity trade. Most notably, the 
Upper Churchill Falls hydroelectricity contract of the 1970s has resulted in a distinct fear of energy 
“wheeling”.  In the early 1950s, Newfoundland Premier Joseph Smallwood invited the British 
Newfoundland Company (Brinco) to develop natural resources across the province. These 
included hydroelectric resources from Churchill Falls. Developments over the 1950s and 1960s, 
including Québec’s refusal to allow electricity transmission from Labrador across Québec to other 
provinces, eventually led to Hydro-Québec signing a contract securing all the power generated 
from Churchill Falls for 65 years at a price of just one-quarter cent per kilowatt hour. 122  This 
electricity was then sold to the United States at high mark-ups, generating profits for Hydro-
Québec. 123  
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The animosity generated by this contract has limited the development of interprovincial 
electricity trade in the intervening years. When the idea of importing electricity from 
Newfoundland through Québec to Ontario was floated in the 1990s, the talks were scuttled due to 
Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams’ animosity towards Hydro-Québec stemming from the 
Upper Churchill Falls hydroelectricity contract.124 Thankfully, the Upper Churchill Falls example 
need not rule out interprovincial capacity-sharing agreements entirely, even as it serves as a lesson 
moving forward. Newfoundland’s experience with Churchill Falls has demonstrated that the issue 
of electricity wheeling must be addressed in any interprovincial electricity contract, since it has 
contributed to the current reluctance of Canadian provinces to engage in a greater level of 
interprovincial cooperation. The Advancing the Dialogue report comes to the conclusion that the 
issue of electricity wheeling could be dealt with by an upfront agreement on the final destination 
of electricity.125 Remaining aware of the potential for electricity wheeling could allow the 
provinces to negotiate contracts to appropriately address this concern. 
Regulatory barriers 
Along with Canada’s history of strong federalism, the political and cultural barriers 
described above seem to have contributed to the disjointed nature of Canada’s electricity sector. 
The Canadian federal government has constitutional authority over the free-flow of goods and 
services between provinces under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and is involved in 
interprovincial and international energy trade and infrastructure.126 The provinces, however, 
maintain sole authority to regulate the exploitation, development, conservation and management 
of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy.127 This means that 
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the regulation of electricity and other resources is fragmented under Canada’s federal system, with 
national and provincial regulators each playing a role in its management. Monopolies by provincial 
electrical utilities discourage the most efficient use of energy resources,128 resulting in Canadian 
electricity producers looking south of the border to get their product to market. This is especially 
true of the province of Québec which, between 2006 and 2008, exported nearly 13.5 times more 
electricity to New York and New England trading partners than to Ontario.129  
Eugene Beaulieu of the University of Calgary Department of Economics has stated that the 
primary problem with respect to interprovincial trade in the energy sector stems from the 
regulatory environment, especially in the form of duplication of regulation in Canada’s federal 
system.130 As an example, he points out that pipelines crossing provincial or international borders 
to bring energy commodities from one province’s market to another are subject to different 
regulatory paradigms than those which remain in the same province.131 With specific regards to 
electricity, each province has its own policy and regulatory agency, leading to “disparate electricity 
tariffs, generation and transmission plans, and renewable/clean energy goals”.132 Pineau attributes 
the underperformance of Canada’s internal electricity market to this fragmented approach.133 It 
seems to mostly be a lack of coordination among the various federal and provincial regulators that 
is currently hampering interprovincial electricity trade, even where that trade could benefit 
multiple trading partners. There is nothing inherently incompatible between the electricity sectors 
of different provinces, so it is possible that greater coordination among the various federal and 
provincial regulators could lead to a more integrated interprovincial electricity trade regime.  
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6. The Agreement on Internal Trade 
  Industry Canada’s website states that the goal of the AIT is to “eliminate barriers to trade, 
investment and mobility within Canada”.134 The AIT came into force on July 1, 1995, and 
negotiations for the agreement brought together ministers and officials from industrial-regional 
policy, trade policy and federal-provincial relations.135 It was signed by the federal government 
and each province/territory at the time – Nunavut currently has observer status. The process of 
developing the AIT was seen very much as actual “negotiations” rather than just “policy-making”, 
with each jurisdiction bringing its own agenda to the table. 136 Doern and MacDonald assert that 
provinces such as British Columbia and Saskatchewan saw the main issues as comprising not only 
a trade agenda, but also one related to federalism and governance, with the main concerns of those 
provinces centering on the powers of provincial governments.137 The different provinces and 
territories each (understandably) took positions reflecting their own relationship to interprovincial 
trade, with Ontario and Québec for instance “couched in the full knowledge of their strong 
trade”.138 
The AIT was developed as a means of addressing the trade flow restrictions that have 
historically been beyond the scope of the Constitution Act, 1867. Some authors have pointed out 
that the AIT emerged out of different circumstances than international trade agreements generally 
do, given the fact that the signatories were already members of a single nation. Robert Howse of 
the C.D. Howe Institute describes the circumstances surrounding international trade negotiations 
as “intergovernmental anarchy”, and points out that this was not the situation in the midst of the 
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AIT negotiations. He highlights that not only were the Canadian provinces and territories members 
of a single nation at the time that the AIT was being negotiated, but that the Canadian constitution 
already implies or requires that there ought to be an economic union within Canada.139 
A paper published by Industry Canada in 1997, just two years after the introduction of the 
AIT, disagrees with Howse’s position. It asserts that Canada’s federalist structure has meant that 
the AIT negotiations more closely resembled the process of developing multilateral international 
agreements. That paper points out the high degree of deference that has historically been shown to 
Canadian provinces in order to not interfere with their respective jurisdictions, stating that the path 
taken by Canadian federalism “has focused more on independence than co-ordination of spheres 
of influence”.140  
Clendenning and Clendenning, the authors of the Industry Canada paper, describe the 
period between 1993 and 1995 leading up to the AIT negotiations as having been preceded by a 
“constitutional maelstrom”.141 Given the enormous amount of deference shown to the federal 
division of power in Canada, the authors state that the AIT negotiations were the result of a 
“constitutional deadlock”142 and that they proceeded with “an almost inordinate sensitivity shown 
to provincial independence as opposed to coordination”.143 According to Clendenning and 
Clendenning, this made for an important proviso which influenced the AIT negotiations. They 
state that, although the parties involved sought to address all existing interprovincial trade barriers 
at the same time, “no parties to the agreement would bind themselves to any limitations on 
legislative power”.144 This reluctance to give up any degree of sovereignty, according to the 
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authors, means that the negotiations unfolded much along the lines of what one would expect for 
an international agreement.145  
The structure of the AIT 
 The AIT is separated into a number of parts, and has been the subject of numerous 
amendments since it first came into effect. A consolidated version of the agreement is available 
online,146 which includes the original AIT text along with its fourteen subsequent Protocols of 
Amendment. Along with a preamble setting out the goals of the AIT, the agreement is separated 
into five distinct sections, each one containing a number of more specific chapters. Part I includes 
general definitions and operating principles; Part II reaffirms the separation of constitutional 
powers and responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments in Canada; Part III 
contains general rules of the AIT such as reciprocal non-discrimination and transparency; Part IV 
contains specific rules related to individual sectors; Part V contains institutional provisions and 
dispute mechanism procedures; and Part VI lays out additional provisions relating to important 
issues not present in any of the other parts, such as the agreement’s relation to culture, national 
security and Aboriginal peoples.  
The rules contained in the chapters of Part IV were meant to flow from the general rules of 
Parts I, II and III. The general rules provisions in Part III include rules regarding what are termed 
“legitimate objectives”. Legitimate objectives are dealt with in Article 404, and provide an 
exception to the other provisions of the AIT agreement. During the AIT negotiations, these 
provisions were reportedly insisted upon by the provinces so as to allow them to implement 
policies that comply with the AIT, even though they might be contrary to some or all of the AIT’s 
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general rules.147 These policies still have to be developed and implemented in such a way as to not 
“impair unduly” the access of economic players148  or be more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
achieve the desired legitimate objective.149 
The bulk of the AIT’s terms are in the specific rules of Part IV. Throughout the negotiation 
process, these provisions were handled mainly by sectoral negotiating teams or “tables”.150 Some 
of the sectors addressed in Part IV are specific in nature, such as those relating to alcoholic 
beverages and agricultural and food goods, while others are scoped more broadly such as the 
chapters on procurement, investment and environmental protection. Energy (along with 
communications, natural resources processing and transportation) has been described as “hybrid 
in nature”, because while it was seen as an industrial sector, it was also acknowledged to be 
horizontal and economy-wide in nature with a clearly crucial impact on virtually every other 
economic sector.151  Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, no agreement was reached with 
regards to the energy chapter, meaning that Chapter Twelve still remains to be “negotiated in 
accordance with Article 1810 – Future Negotiations”.152  
 Article 1810 sets out the procedures through which the AIT agreement is to be reviewed, 
and by which it may be expanded to contain new chapters or cover sectors not already included in 
the agreement. It begins by stating that the parties agree to conclude negotiations on Chapter 
Twelve no later than the date of entry into force of the AIT agreement.153 This has of course not 
been the case, since no energy chapter has yet been implemented. With regards to general rules of 
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procedure for amending the agreement, Article 1810.4 states that the Committee on Internal Trade 
(“CIT”) is to meet annually to review the scope and coverage of the agreement, and that it may 
make recommendations for the inclusion of new measures or new chapters. The CIT is a committee 
established by the parties to the AIT negotiations tasked with: supervising the implementation of 
the agreement; assisting in dispute resolution; approving the annual operating budget of the 
Internal Trade Secretariat established through Article 1603; and considering any other matter that 
may affect the operation of the agreement.154   
Progress on the AIT energy chapter 
 As previously mentioned, the AIT energy chapter was left unfinished when the agreement 
came into force in July 1995, with the intent that the energy chapter would be completed and 
implemented at a later date in accordance with Article 1810 of the AIT. It is important to note that 
Article 1810.3 states that until Chapter Twelve is negotiated, agreed upon and made part of the 
AIT agreement, no provisions of the AIT may apply to any measures relating to energy goods or 
services.155 This means that even portions of the AIT which could have potential positive impacts, 
such as general non-discrimination rules, will not apply to the energy sector until Chapter Twelve 
is finally included in the agreement.  
 Some progress has been made over the years towards finalizing Chapter Twelve, indicating 
that the provinces are still interested in moving forward with an AIT energy chapter. Yearly 
progress reports are available on the AIT website156 managed by the Internal Trade Secretariat, 
giving status updates on amendments to the AIT as well as developments regarding chapters that 
are still changing or have yet to be implemented, such as Chapter Twelve.  
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 No specific updates on the energy chapter are available from the first few years after the 
AIT came into force, although a draft energy chapter was written in 1998. The first Sectoral 
Chapter Report arrived in 2004/2005. It began by stating that the objective of Chapter Twelve is 
to harmonize the treatment of energy goods and services. According to the report, in August 2004, 
provincial and territorial internal trade ministers were directed by their respective premiers to 
complete negotiations for the AIT energy chapter, with Alberta as the lead jurisdiction. Progress 
in the 2004/2005 year included the establishment of a working group of federal and 
provincial/territorial internal trade and energy officials (named the Energy Negotiations Working 
Group), as well as the development of a preliminary report on energy chapter negotiations and the 
development of terms of reference for a workplan. The workplan developed through those 
negotiations157 included a review of the relevance of the AIT energy chapter, which resulted in 
general agreement that the goal of the chapter should be to achieve broad market access for energy 
goods and services. This broadened the scope of the chapter beyond the electricity focus which 
dominated initial negotiations and which was the extent of the draft energy chapter written back 
in 1998.158  
 The annual progress report released for the years 2005/2006 gave more updates on the 
status of Chapter Twelve negotiations. It began by stating the goal of the energy chapter slightly 
differently than the previous year’s report, saying that it would be to provide market access 
provisions and non-discriminatory treatment for energy goods and services. In the 2005/2006 year, 
a proposal was developed by trade and energy officials specifically relating to regional 
development measures around petroleum oil and gas, while at the same time satisfying other 
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provisions of the AIT relating to regional economic development. More “next steps” were 
established, and a report was prepared on the status of negotiations between officials of the CIT 
which took place in June 2005. 
In January 2006, a progress report was also released discussing the headway that had been 
made up to that point in meeting the goals of the 2004 workplan. The development of an energy 
chapter for the AIT was listed in that document as a “longer-term objective”. The workplan 
progress report stated that the negotiations on the completion of an AIT energy chapter had 
advanced significantly, and that the parties had seemingly overcome the major hurdles which had 
previously prevented them from implementing an energy chapter under the AIT. The report also 
highlighted the fact that the parties agreed that the scope of an AIT energy chapter should be on 
market access provisions for all energy goods and services, rather than just being constrained to 
the focus on electricity of the initial 1998 draft.  
 The 2006/2007 iteration of the progress report maintained the same definition of the AIT 
energy chapter’s objective as stated in 2005/2006, saying once again that its goal would be to 
provide market access provisions and non-discriminatory treatment of energy goods and services. 
Most notably in that year, more negotiations took place around the relationship between Chapter 
Twelve and economic development measures, and the province of Alberta drafted an Energy 
Chapter outline based on the model set by the Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement 
(“TILMA”) between the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia.159  
 No new information was released on the status of Chapter Twelve negotiations in 
2007/2008, with the annual update simply restating the same information as the previous year’s 
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report. The 2008/2009 progress report, however, recognized that concluding an energy chapter had 
remained an outstanding obligation since the AIT came into effect in 1995 and stated that the 
development of that chapter had remained a key element of the Council of the Federation 
(“COF”)’s plan to improve internal trade since 2004. At a CIT meeting in 2008, a report was 
presented to the ministers proposing two options with regards to potential routes for the structure 
of an AIT energy chapter: the first dealt solely with trade in energy goods, their transportation and 
transmission; while the second, broader option, would seek to extend the coverage of the AIT to 
include trade in all energy goods and energy services as well as the production of energy goods. 
Unfortunately, the CIT was unable to reach a consensus on which option to choose.  
In 2009/2010, the COF directed the provinces to conclude the negotiations of the AIT 
energy chapter at the fall 2009 meeting of the CIT. A complete draft energy chapter was presented 
to the CIT, and all but one of the provinces were in support of implementing the draft chapter. 
However, consensus is required to include new chapters in the AIT,160 so although nearly all parties 
supported the formal inclusion of the draft chapter into the AIT, the chapter was rejected. 
Unfortunately, the draft was never released to the public,161 so it is not currently available for 
analysis. Although the draft energy chapter was not included in the AIT, it served as the basis for 
negotiations to develop an energy agreement outside of the AIT pursuant to AIT Article 1800, 
which states that nothing in the AIT prevents parties from entering into other bilateral or 
multilateral agreements to enhance trade and mobility. 
No further progress on the AIT energy chapter was made in the 2010/2011 year, and the 
negotiations to develop a separate energy agreement outside of the AIT fell through. The status of 
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Chapter Twelve negotiations remained unchanged in 2011/2012, 2012/2013, and 2013/2014. A 
document was released in September 2015 outlining achievements regarding the AIT to date, on a 
chapter-by-chapter basis.162 With regards to energy, the document lists two achievements. The first 
states that negotiations have continued in order to complete an energy chapter to “enhance market 
access provisions and non-discriminatory treatment of energy goods and energy services”. The 
second achievement outlined in that document refers to the draft energy chapter written in 2009 
that has not yet been implemented. It highlights that the draft chapter reflects the relatively free 
trade in energy goods and services related to the transmission and transportation of energy goods; 
that the draft text reflects trade liberalization which has already occurred in the energy sector; and 
that the parties have agreed to include energy conservation and energy efficiency as legitimate 
objectives under Article 404.  
Enforcement mechanisms 
 The AIT’s dispute resolution process and enforcement mechanisms are outlined in Chapter 
Seventeen. Although the chapter’s goal is to promote cooperation and dispute resolution in a 
“conciliatory, cooperative and harmonious manner”,163 some enforcement mechanisms are 
available in the event that a mutually satisfactory resolution cannot be achieved through 
cooperation. The dispute resolution process begins with government-to-government consultations 
involving the disputing parties and the Internal Trade Secretariat. Where the matter remains 
unresolved, a panel is established to address the dispute. The panel must prepare a report 
containing its findings on whether the measure complained of is inconsistent with the AIT, whether 
the measure has impaired or would impair internal trade, recommendations to assist in resolving 
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the dispute, and a determination with regards to operational costs.164 Wherever possible, disputes 
are to be resolved by removing the offending measure,165 although panels may also impose 
monetary penalties. If the matter is still not resolved one year after the panel’s issuance of its 
report, retaliatory measures or a suspension of benefits is possible under Article 1709. 
 The enforcement procedure outlined in the AIT is fairly robust, and mirrors similar dispute 
resolution procedures in international agreements such as the GATT. However, Article 1701 
outlines a number of exceptions to Chapter Seventeen. Examples of measures to which Chapter 
Seventeen’s enforcement mechanisms don’t apply include Annex 405.2 (Regulatory Measures and 
Regulatory Regimes). Annex 405.2 states that parties shall seek to reconcile their standards and 
standard-related measures, and that they should address differences in regulatory regimes or 
measures which create obstacles to internal trade. Carving out Annex 405.2 as an exception to the 
AIT’s enforcement regime is a way to allow provinces to retain some degree of autonomy in terms 
of setting standards and creating regulatory regimes. However, since evidence suggests that the 
internal trade barriers in the electricity sector are at least partially the result of disjointed regulatory 
regimes, this also means that the enforcement mechanisms of the AIT will have a limited bearing 
on some aspects of energy sector trade barriers.  
Outcomes of the AIT 
The actual level of success achieved by the AIT in eliminating interprovincial barriers to 
free trade has been the subject of some dispute. Clendenning and Clendenning contend that the 
commitment to freer trade was made only in principle.166 However, there is also evidence that at 
least some portions of the AIT have resulted in greater mobility among goods and services between 
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provinces. With an important barrier to trade in the energy sector seeming to be a lack of 
coordination among regulators,167 it is worthwhile to examine the AIT’s level of success at 
reducing regulatory barriers under other chapters which have already been implemented. Donald 
Lenihan, senior associate at the Public Policy Forum in Ottawa, has argued that the AIT chapter 
on labour mobility is one of the more successful chapters in the agreement in terms of harmonizing 
regulations and standards.168 In his report on the economic impacts of the AIT, Beaulieu assesses 
the actual impacts of the AIT’s labour mobility chapter on the harmonization of regulations and 
standards, pointing out some of the chapter’s successes as well as some of its shortcomings. He 
notes that the AIT requires parties to mutually recognize occupational qualifications, for instance, 
but that the agreement leaves differences in occupational standards to be reconciled between 
parties. He also points out that the chapter on labour mobility contains a fundamental shortcoming 
in the form of a wide range of “legitimate objectives” providing for multiple exceptions. Beaulieu 
points out that these legitimate objectives include labour market development and the provision of 
adequate social and health services to all geographic regions of a given jurisdiction. He suggests 
that the broad definitions given to these two additional legitimate objectives undermine the 
intention of the chapter.169   
There are signs, however, that the evolution of the AIT is moving in the right direction for 
the free movement of goods and services in Canada. In 2009, a number of amendments were 
introduced to the AIT affecting the labour mobility chapter. The amendments focused heavily on 
the recognition of worker certifications between provinces, and on other measures to reduce 
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barriers to labour mobility.170 The amendments sought to address these issues by requiring the 
elimination of local residency requirements; mandating certification of workers in Canadian 
provinces and territories previously certified in another Canadian jurisdiction; mandating that 
certification processes for workers from other jurisdictions be transparent, objective and impartial; 
and requiring regulators to provide publicly accessible certification information.171 More 
importantly, “labour market development” has been removed as a legitimate objective in the most 
recent consolidated version of the AIT, demonstrating that steps are being taken to strike a balance 
between provinces’ own internal autonomy and the broader goal of encouraging interprovincial 
free trade. 
7. The AIT energy chapter in a broader context 
Recent developments have shown that there may be growing political will for Canadian 
Provinces and territories to engage in greater cooperation in the electricity sector. Over the past 
few years, attempts have been made to promote increased interprovincial cooperation, perhaps 
making it the right time for an energy chapter to finally be added to the AIT. By transforming the 
current political will into concrete measures to promote cooperation, this trend could be 
encouraged to continue into the future. With the current push towards developing a more 
sustainable energy sector in Canada, and with Ontario undergoing a major restructuring of its 
electricity sector in terms of infrastructure investments, an AIT energy chapter with the capacity 
to facilitate interprovincial electricity trade could help to pave the way for Québec and Ontario to 
move forwards with current plans to swap electricity and cement their trade partnership. The 
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following section outlines some past and present examples of national and interprovincial 
cooperation in the electricity sector, and discusses how an AIT energy chapter could function 
alongside these initiatives.  
2007: A Shared Vision for Energy in Canada 
In 2007, the COF released a report titled A Shared Vision for Energy in Canada,172 
outlining its plan for an interprovincial energy strategy. The main focus of this plan was to build 
on the previous initiatives developed by individual provinces through “a seven point action plan 
that strikes a balance between energy supply, environmental and social responsibility, and 
continued economic growth and prosperity”.173 Two key components of the plan were to place an 
emphasis on GHG emission reductions, and to contribute to continued economic growth and 
prosperity.174 As briefly outlined above and addressed in more detail in Advancing the Dialogue, 
these are also the types of contributions that could be made by increased interprovincial electricity 
trade between the provinces of Québec and Ontario. Hydropower is highlighted in A Shared Vision 
as one of the clean technologies that could facilitate the achievement of the plan’s goals, with the 
report pointing out that hydroelectricity made up 58.5 per cent of Canada’s total electricity 
produced in 2004175 (it has since increased to 63 per cent of Canada’s total electricity 
production).176 The report advocates for increased energy transmission between Canadian 
provinces as a way to achieve a number of benefits, including: promoting energy supply and 
reliability; enabling the development of new renewable and clean energy resources; reducing 
regional supply/demand disparities; and benefitting provinces and territories that produce 
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electricity resources as well as those that consume them. The COF also pointed out some obstacles 
that would have to be overcome in order to achieve the goals set out in its report, emphasizing the 
fact that the efficiency of the energy sector has been reduced by a “complex web” of regulatory 
processes.177 Fully implementing Chapter Twelve of the AIT could help to reduce some of the 
regulatory barriers to interprovincial electricity trade in Canada by increasing cooperation among 
provinces and ensuring that provincial and federal regulators work together in the interest of a 
well-coordinated energy sector.  
The AIT energy chapter could also help address some of the barriers set out in A Shared 
Vision through other portions of the AIT. As previously described, Article 1810.3 prohibits any 
part of the AIT from applying to energy goods or services until Chapter Twelve is negotiated and 
implemented. The COF’s report states that another barrier to energy projects in Canada is in 
relation to insufficient labour mobility.178 By making it so that Chapter Seven of the AIT on Labour 
Mobility, for instance, also applies to the energy sector, a finalized Chapter Twelve could help 
address this and similar concerns raised in A Shared Vision. 
2009: Ontario and Québec Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
 There have been some recent moves by the provinces of Ontario and Québec towards a 
more integrated trade relationship. In 2009, the two provinces entered into the bilateral Ontario 
and Québec Trade and Cooperation Agreement179 (“OQTCA”) outside of the AIT, allowed under 
AIT Article 1800 (Trade Enhancement Arrangements). Along with the goals of addressing 
economic challenges and eliminating interprovincial trade barriers, the OQTCA aims to “enhance 
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regulatory cooperation” and to “promote sustainable development”.180 The OQTCA covers much 
of the same subject matter as the AIT, but the inclusion of issues not currently covered in the AIT 
sets it apart. The OQTCA contains an energy chapter that aims to increase interprovincial 
cooperation in the energy sector, although it could still go further with regards to specifics and 
does not take into account recent developments.  
 Chapter Four of the OQTCA deals with Energy Cooperation between Ontario and Québec.  
Specifically, the chapter emphasizes cooperation regarding energy policies.181 It has a limited 
focus on sustainability, stating that the parties shall promote “inter-jurisdictional cooperation in 
energy policies and a modern, reliable, and environmentally responsible series of energy 
transmission and transportation networks”.182 The chapter’s other goals include improving “the 
economic efficiency of the energy sector” and increasing “the reliability of energy supply and 
infrastructure, within Ontario and Québec”.183 Specific responsibilities are laid out for energy 
ministers in the two provinces. These include providing a forum for discussions on joint energy 
solutions and overseeing the program of energy cooperation activities between the parties.184  
The OQTCA also establishes an Energy Cooperation Committee to be co-chaired by senior 
officials from both Ontario and Québec, and which is responsible for reporting to the provinces’ 
respective ministers. The committee is tasked with identifying options for additional cooperation 
opportunities. The committee’s mandate is to:  
a) assist and support Ministers in the fulfillment of their obligations under the Chapter; 
b) oversee the day-to-day implementation and management of the Chapter; 
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c) identify opportunities and develop options for consideration by Ministers for additional 
cooperative activities; and 
d) report annually to Ministers.185 
The OQTCA does not, however, include any specific mention of developing either 
electricity swap or purchase agreements. Although the OQTCA does include a chapter on 
“Regulatory Cooperation”, it does not specifically address electricity regulators within Chapter 
Four. Furthermore, the fact that the OQTCA was developed in 2009 means that much has happened 
in the Québec-Ontario energy sector in the intervening years. An AIT energy chapter could pick 
up where the OQTCA left off by devoting itself specifically to facilitating regulatory cooperation 
and regional energy planning among various provinces, which could help Ontario and Québec to 
further develop their relationship as trading partners. The OQTCA’s energy chapter focuses largely 
on directing responsible authorities to identify opportunities for cooperation. Now that these 
opportunities have been identified studies and reports such as Advancing the Dialogue, the AIT 
energy chapter could focus specifically on making those opportunities a reality. 
There is minimal literature analyzing the achievements of the OQTCA and almost none on 
the Energy Cooperation Committee, making it difficult to evaluate the level of success of the 
OQTCA’s energy chapter. It is possible, however, that an AIT energy chapter could make more 
headway towards achieving regional or national energy sector cooperation through the 
involvement of the other Canadian provinces and Territories, as well as the federal government. It 
could also create a body similar to the Energy Cooperation Committee with the specific goal of 
encouraging electricity trade between provinces through regional-scale planning. 
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2014-2015: Memoranda of Understanding 
 Over the past two years, Ontario and Québec have signed a number of MOUs indicating 
their willingness to cooperate on the issues of climate change strategy, interprovincial trade and 
energy policy. 
 Three of these MOUs were signed in November 2014. The first expressed the two 
provinces’ intention to “develop a vision and long-term objectives in the fight against climate 
change”.186 It contained specific references to collaboration on market-based mechanisms by 
linking with California as part of the WCI, in order to facilitate the transition to a low carbon 
economy while creating jobs and promoting economic wealth. 
 The second MOU signed in November 2014 was aimed at revitalizing the trade relationship 
between Ontario and Québec through a renewal of the OQTCA. It made a few changes to the 
existing agreement text from 2009, mostly in the area of government procurement. However, it 
also indicated the provinces’ intentions to collaborate more closely in a number of other areas, 
with the energy sector among them. The MOU stated that Ontario and Québec would look for 
ways to enhance and expand existing cooperation provisions through an update to the Energy 
Chapter of the agreement.187 Although no update to that chapter has been implemented to date, 
this is another indication that the political will to move forwards with greater energy cooperation 
between the two provinces is growing.  
 The third MOU released in November 2014 was on the topic of a seasonal electricity 
exchange between Ontario and Québec. As already discussed, Ontario currently experiences its 
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peak electricity demand in the summer, while Québec is a winter-peaking jurisdiction.188 Each 
province must have enough electricity to meet its needs at its times of highest demand. Rather than 
each province building that capacity independently from one another, this MOU articulates the 
provinces’ intention to establish a capacity swap agreement to exchange 500 megawatts of 
electricity from Ontario to Québec in the winter, and vice versa in the summer.189 This is one of 
the potential electricity collaboration scenarios discussed in Advancing the Dialogue, and again 
demonstrates that there is a willingness for the two provinces to collaborate in the energy sector. 
 An MOU released in October 2015 expanded on the idea of capacity exchanges between 
the provinces of Ontario and Québec, and suggested that increased collaboration in the energy 
sector could be beneficial for both provinces. Building on the provinces’ acknowledgements that 
they must work together to address the threat of climate change, that Québec enjoys surplus clean 
hydroelectricity and that Ontario will require temporary sources of electricity while its nuclear 
plants undergo refurbishment, the provinces agreed to maintain an “open and on-going dialogue 
on opportunities for bilateral collaboration”.190  The agreement serves as a recognition by both 
Ontario and Québec that the two provinces could further benefit from electricity trade in more than 
a seasonal swap capacity, and acknowledges that an agreement which secures electricity for 
Ontario from Québec while Ontario’s nuclear refurbishments are underway could be beneficial to 
both parties. The agreement has been called a “significant step in their partnership” that “will 
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explore the potential for increased trade in electricity to provide savings to Ontario ratepayers and 
help meet Ontario’s energy needs through Québec’s clean and renewable electricity supply”.191 
Also pursuant to this MOU, the Ontario and Québec ministers and deputy ministers 
responsible for energy are to meet on a quarterly basis to discuss and explore opportunities for 
greater electricity trade.192 Similarly, the ministers are also instructed to mandate their respective 
energy agencies, the IESO and Hydro Québec to also meet on a quarterly basis to share best 
practices and lessons learned, and to identify emerging opportunities regarding electricity trade.193 
Through this MOU, the governments of Québec and Ontario acknowledged that there remains 
untapped potential for mutual benefits through greater interprovincial collaboration in the energy 
sector. The meetings mandated between energy officials and regulatory agencies are also a step in 
the right direction, but don’t have as much force in an MOU as they would have in a more 
formalized agreement. A similar requirement for regular meetings could be another useful addition 
to the AIT energy chapter. 
2015: A Canadian Energy Strategy 
 In July 2012, the COF established a working group led by the premiers of Alberta, 
Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador. This working group was instructed to work with 
provincial and territorial energy ministers to build on the 2007 A Shared Vision report to assess 
new challenges facing the energy sector and ensure that Canada has a “strategic, forward thinking 
approach for sustainable energy development that recognizes regional strengths and priorities”.194 
Provincial and territorial premiers agreed that the renewed COF energy strategy should include 
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maintaining effective and efficient regulatory systems, and affirming intergovernmental 
cooperation.195 This renewed process resulted in the publication of a Canadian Energy Strategy196 
in July 2015. The national energy strategy developed by the provinces focuses on three main goals: 
sustainability and conservation; technology and innovation; and delivering energy to people.197 
The AIT energy chapter has the potential to work alongside the third goal in particular. The areas 
of focus ascribed to the goal of “delivering energy to people” include developing an efficient 
domestic and import/export electricity transmission network; improving the regulatory process; 
and promoting the participation of provinces and territories in international negotiations. All of 
these areas of focus speak to the fact that there is a recognized need for greater cooperation between 
provinces, territories and the federal government. Along with the objective of identifying 
opportunities to develop, transport and transmit energy, however, the energy strategy adds the 
caveat of doing so in accordance with provincial-territorial jurisdiction.198 Although it is of course 
necessary for provinces and territories’ jurisdictions to be respected, the express inclusion of this 
caveat seems to demonstrate the same type of provincialist sentiment that has prevented greater 
energy integration in the past. Formalizing the various provincial and territorial actors’ intention 
to work cooperatively through the development of an AIT energy chapter could be an important 
step towards overcoming this sentiment in order to facilitate future cooperation.   
2017: Ontario’s entry into the Western Climate Initiative  
 The Canadian Energy Strategy cites market approaches as a favourable way to transition 
to a low-carbon economy. One market initiative which has been picking up steam in recent years 
is the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”). The WCI is an initiative to link the cap-and-trade 
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systems of participating Canadian provinces and American states to set an interjurisdictional price 
on carbon with the goal of reducing regional GHG emissions to 15 per cent below 2005 levels by 
2020. It involves a regional “cap” on greenhouse gas emissions and uses tradeable permits to 
provide an incentive to switch to low-carbon energy sources.199  
 Québec is already an active member of the WCI alongside California. Ontario will join the 
carbon trading regime200 once its own cap-and-trade system is introduced in 2017, with Manitoba 
also planning to become an active member.201 While Ontario’s entry into the WCI’s carbon market 
will reduce the risk of southward capital outflow, 202  increased electricity imports into Ontario 
from Québec could also help to harmonize electricity prices between the two provinces.  Given 
the level of market integration that will occur between Québec and Ontario with the latter’s 
entrance into the WCI’s carbon market, a higher level of cooperation in the electricity sector 
between the two provinces in anticipation of 2017 also makes sense. 
 Ontario recently released the proposed Climate Change Mitigation and Low Carbon 
Economy Act (“Climate Change Act”), which provides details on how the province’s cap-and-trade 
system will function. One key step that the Climate Change Act will take is to establish a Green 
Investment Fund. This fund will allocate the money collected through Ontario’s cap-and-trade 
system to financing projects that fight climate change.203 Although more details on the program 
are yet to be released, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that part of the funds from this 
program could be directed towards developing Ontario’s clean energy infrastructure, which could 
include investments in transmission capacity to import hydro power from Québec. With new 
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details of the Green Investment Fund and Ontario’s cap-and-trade system yet to be released, more 
work could be done in this area to secure funding for new electricity transmission infrastructure. 
8. Potential energy chapter content 
 The previous sections have summarized the types of trade barriers identified in Canada’s 
energy sector and the ways in which the AIT energy chapter would relate to previous electricity 
cooperation initiatives. The current section seeks to identify key components that the AIT energy 
chapter should include.  
Regardless of the content of the AIT energy chapter, drafting it would have the positive 
result of making the rest of the AIT apply to the electricity sector. General rules provisions such 
as Article 405 on the harmonization of regulatory measures, and provisions from chapters on topics 
such as labour mobility, could have positive impacts on interprovincial electricity trade. These will 
become applicable to the electricity sector once Chapter Twelve is finalized. 
In terms of specific provisions, Chapter Twelve could use the already-implemented AIT 
and OQTCA chapters as models. AIT Chapter Eleven on Natural Resources Processing would be 
a good starting point, given that natural resources are under the same constitutional provincial 
authority as electricity204 – meaning that the same constitutional division of powers applies to both 
sectors. Following this model would ensure that the jurisdiction of provinces and territories over 
their own resources is respected in accordance with the Canadian Energy Strategy.205 The OQTCA 
energy chapter could also serve as a good example, given that it already deals with interprovincial 
electricity trade between Ontario and Québec. 
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In order to ensure that the AIT strives to encourage a sustainable electricity sector, the 
energy chapter should include some reference to environmental considerations. Although the AIT 
is based on a fairly traditional conception of free trade, the agreement does include limited 
precedent for taking environmental considerations into account. Chapter Fifteen on Environmental 
Protection includes a provision mandating that parties “in dealing with trade matters, take into 
account the need to restore, maintain and enhance the environment”.206 This provision is limited 
in scope to environmental measures that may affect the interprovincial mobility of people or 
interprovincial trade in goods,207 but it could provide an example for a sustainability provision in 
the energy chapter. The OQTCA energy chapter mandates that sustainability considerations be 
taken into account through its encouragement of “environmentally responsible” transmission 
networks, and could provide another good example for the new AIT chapter. 208 This type of 
provision could help to encourage positive environmental outcomes such as replacing nuclear and 
hydrocarbon-generated electricity with hydro and other renewables. 
In relation to political barriers, drafting and including an energy chapter in the AIT is a step 
in the right direction. Each jurisdiction within Canada has developed its own electricity system 
independently of one other, which has led to a variety of different generation portfolios.209 Each 
province and territory has its own energy sources and uses, making for a number of unique energy 
needs and priorities.210 The distinctly provincial nature of the electricity system in Canada has 
meant that there exists a sense of unease with regards to “out-of-province interference”,211 and that 
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pursuing interprovincial collaboration has the potential to lead to a political backlash.212 However, 
trends in recent years have demonstrated that the concept of interprovincial electricity 
collaboration is beginning to make its way onto the political agenda, and is finding a place at the 
centre of many policy discussions. The number of MOUs relating to collaboration on the issues of 
climate change, interprovincial trade and electricity generation demonstrates that Ontario and 
Québec are realizing that increased interprovincial cooperation in the energy sector could bring 
benefits to both parties.  The recent creation of the Canadian Energy Strategy indicates that this 
issue is also on the radar of the other Canadian provinces. MOUs and policy documents are non-
binding, however, and more concrete measures are needed to solidify interprovincial collaboration. 
The AIT could serve as a way to codify processes that can help to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination among the various federal and provincial regulators. 
In order to address regulatory trade barriers, the AIT energy chapter could include 
provisions on the reconciliation of measures which have an impact on interprovincial electricity 
trade. These could be based on Article 1105 of the AIT’s Chapter Eleven on Natural Resources 
Processing, which mandates that every effort be made to reconcile “measures that have an impact 
on trade in the processing of natural resources”. In the same vein, the AIT’s energy chapter could 
also include objectives similar to those in the OQTCA to: improve knowledge-sharing; explore 
ways to enhance interconnectedness; build on the synergies between the electricity systems and 
work towards more interconnected electricity systems by improving planning coordination, co-
operation and encouragement of electricity interconnectedness; and exploring opportunities for the 
development and harmonization of broader regional energy systems.213 
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While the creation of general provisions would be a good step towards increasing 
interprovincial collaboration, a significant contribution could be made by following the example 
of the AIT chapter on Natural Resources Processing and establishing a working group similar to 
the one created under AIT Article 1104. The purpose of the Working Group on Processing of 
Natural Resources is to: assess whether the chapter has met its objectives; identify and resolve 
outstanding implementation issues respecting the chapter; revise the chapter to accommodate 
changing principles under the AIT agreement; and review the opportunities for progress on matters 
related to the processing of natural resources that are not covered in, or are excluded from, the 
chapter. A Working Group on Energy could fulfill a similar function in the electricity sector.  
It could also be beneficial to make the new Working Group on Energy’s mandate more 
comprehensive by following the example of Chapter Four of the OQTCA on Energy Cooperation. 
The OQTCA’s Energy Cooperation Committee is assigned more responsibilities than the AIT’s 
Working Group on Processing of Natural Resources due to the number of Article 4.4’s Energy 
Cooperation Activities. It is specifically instructed to enhance interconnectedness for clean and 
renewable energy exchanges, and to build on the synergies between the electricity systems of 
Ontario and Québec to work towards more interconnected electricity systems.214 The Working 
Group on Energy could similarly be instructed to promote the interconnectivity of the Canadian 
electrical system and to coordinate cross-jurisdictional energy planning. 
Although the AIT’s Working Group on Energy could take up some of the same 
responsibilities as the OQTCA’s Energy Cooperation Committee in terms of identifying 
opportunities for greater collaboration in the electricity sector, its focus should be on addressing 
the opportunities that have already been identified. With the benefits of various trade scenarios 
                                                 
214 OQTCA, supra note 179 art, 4.4. 
60 
 
having already been analyzed in the Advancing the Dialogue report and the recent MOUs between 
Ontario and Québec, it is no longer enough to identify opportunities for collaboration. Action must 
be taken to seize the opportunities that have already been identified.  
The AIT’s Working Group on Energy should also follow the OQTCA’s Energy 
Cooperation Committee’s example of holding regular meetings. The AIT’s Working Group on 
Processing of Natural Resources is only instructed to meet every two years under Article 1104.2 
of the AIT. Given the speed at which developments in the electricity sector can progress, this 
timeline would likely be inadequate for a Working Group on Energy. The OQTCA mandates that 
the Energy Cooperation Committee report to the provincial Energy Ministers annually, who are in 
turn required to meet at the request of a Party.215 The Working Group on Energy would ideally 
meet at least that frequently. A more appropriate avenue might be to follow the requirement for 
quarterly meetings mandated between ministers and deputy ministers responsible for energy under 
Ontario and Québec’s 2015 MOU on Energy Collaboration.216  
The main advantage in creating an energy chapter for the AIT rather than simply relying 
on the OQTCA is the fact that the latter agreement only applies to the provinces of Ontario and 
Québec. Although the goal of the present paper is to analyze the AIT’s potential to help facilitate 
electricity trade between those two provinces, the new energy chapter could work to achieve 
greater electricity collaboration across Canada. Incorporating other provinces into the agreement 
could be useful for energy planning on a larger scale and could help to secure the involvement of 
federal regulators. Agencies such as the NEB do play a limited role in interprovincial electricity 
transmission, as previously described. They could fulfill a coordination function among different 
provincial regulators, helping to develop electricity policies that are in the best interests of Canada 
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as a whole. Having the federal government as a partner in facilitating interprovincial electricity 
trade could also help to obtain federal funding. The recent federal budget allocates 2.5 million 
dollars to “advancing regional electricity cooperation” by facilitating regional dialogues.217 The 
willingness of the federal government to fund this type of cooperation could take some of the 
financial burden off of the provinces.  
Including an energy chapter in the AIT could also provide a basis for future collaboration 
among the various jurisdictions. The Advancing the Dialogue report points out that a policy 
framework for free trade in electricity trade does not currently exist, and “must be created anew 
every time negotiations are opened”.218 Perhaps the most important function that the AIT energy 
chapter could fulfill is to get the various electricity sector actors on the same page. As previously 
described, the political and regulatory barriers in the electricity sector can be traced back to the 
disjointed nature of electricity regulation in Canada. One issue that was raised in Advancing the 
Dialogue is the lack of a coordinated plan for Canada’s energy future. It was stated that the most 
important barrier to collaboration in the energy sector could be the “lack of vision for what the 
future system built around provincial electricity and climate change collaboration could or should 
look like”.219 Finally drafting a document which brings all provincial, territorial and federal actors 
to the table could cement a unified vision for Canada’s energy sector. 
9. Conclusion 
The IESO’s report on interprovincial interties demonstrates that increased electricity trade 
between Ontario and Québec is technically feasible, and that it could cost much less than 
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proceeding with Ontario’s planned nuclear refurbishments. The main barriers to interprovincial 
electricity collaboration therefore seem to be mostly regulatory, political, and cultural. The 
disjointed nature of Canada’s electricity sector is the result of the country’s federal constitution 
and the provinces’ historic focus on electricity self-sufficiency, along with their over-reliance on 
the United States as an export market. Canada’s strong history of provincial autonomy in the 
electricity sector, coupled with the disjointed nature of the provincial and federal regulatory 
schemes, has resulted in more electricity being sent southwards to the United States than between 
Canadian provinces and territories. The key to securing the benefits of increased electricity trade 
outlined in the Advancing the Dialogue report likely lies in addressing the current political and 
cultural barriers to internal trade.  
Pineau suggests that an AIT energy chapter could result in electricity market integration in 
Canada.220 In the 2006 progress report on its Workplan on Internal Trade, the COF acknowledged 
that the addition of an energy chapter to the AIT “would close a significant gap, and would 
represent a major step forward in expanding coverage of the Agreement”. 221 The AIT energy 
chapter could draw inspiration from existing documents such as the OQTCA and the AIT’s chapter 
on Natural Resources Processing. It could follow their examples by establishing a Working Group 
on Energy, but could mandate that the working group meet more regularly and that it focus 
specifically on interprovincial market integration and supra-regional electricity planning. 
Completing the AIT’s Chapter Twelve on Energy would make other parts of the agreement 
applicable to the energy sector. It could cement the growing political will associated with 
interprovincial cooperation, and could serve as a basis for future negotiations. Perhaps most 
importantly, it could ensure that all provinces, territories and the federal government are on the 
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same page. By promoting a unified vision for Canada’s electricity sector, the AIT energy chapter 
would fit in with recent initiatives for interprovincial cooperation and could facilitate the 
development of a national energy strategy. 
Recent signs demonstrate that the provincial, territorial and federal governments are 
willing to work together to fight climate change and develop a more integrated electricity sector. 
These include the new Prime Minister’s invitation to territorial and provincial premiers to join him 
at the Paris climate talks, the commitment of Québec, Ontario and Manitoba to participate in the 
WCI, and the recent allocation of resources to advancing regional electricity cooperation in the 
federal budget. Implementing an AIT energy chapter that applies to all provinces and territories, 
now that the political will seems to exist for increased collaboration, could help to establish a 
framework for negotiations moving forward.  
The main question that remains, however, is whether an AIT energy chapter could receive 
the consensus of all the necessary parties. Given that the original agreement was reached in 1995 
and that no energy chapter has been included to date, it seems that hoping for consensus to be 
reached through AIT negotiations could be an unrealistic expectation. Although advancements 
have been made on Chapter Twelve as described in the annual progress reports, the similarity of 
AIT negotiations to the development of international treaties demonstrates the difficulties that 
would have to be overcome. For this reason, it is possible that the best option for Ontario and 
Québec is to proceed through bilateral negotiations.  
Recent agreements such as the 2009 OQTCA and the 2014 and 2015 MOUs between 
Ontario and Québec have demonstrated a growing recognition that increased electricity 
collaboration could have benefits for both provinces, even though Ontario’s Energy Minister has 
been hesitant to accept hydroelectricity imports as a replacement for Ontario’s nuclear 
64 
 
refurbishments. The relationship between the two provinces has progressed at a much faster pace 
than the development of the AIT, which speaks to the fact that achieving consensus among two 
trading partners is much easier than among thirteen. Although the AIT could offer a host of unique 
benefits, renewing the OQTCA could be the best option for facilitating electricity collaboration 
between Québec and Ontario. A willingness already exists to update the agreement, as 
demonstrated by the MOU on that topic. The OQTCA energy chapter could be amended to include 
a greater focus on sustainability and on electricity trade between the two provinces. The apparent 
willingness for the two provinces to work collaboratively in the electricity sector could perhaps 
most effectively be cemented through this bilateral agreement than by waiting for the difficult-to-
achieve benefits that would come from updating the AIT. 
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